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Introduction
THIS study investigates the impact of unconventional monetary policy (UMP)1 actions on the risk taking behavior of banks. Re-cent studies such as Paligorova and Santos (2012), Dellis et al. (2012), and Angeloni et al. (2015) argue that the prolonged period 
of low interest rate in the aftermath of the dot-com recession has encouraged 
banks to take excessive risk. According to these studies, there is a significant 
positive relationship between expansionary monetary policy measures and 
the amount of risk that the banks take. However, this positive relationship 
may not hold for the post-crisis period because of the following reasons. 
First, the financial crisis caused liquidity problems among the banks, 
which led to the credit crunch phenomenon2. Because of the resulting short-
age of capital, the banks became risk averse about lending to businesses and 
individuals as well as to other banks (Lowth et al., 2010). Secondly, when the 
central bank repeats the same actions in the same circumstances, agents in 
the economy learn to respond in a particular way. However, when the policy 
rule changes, there will be a period when households and firms learn how to 
respond to the new rules of the game. The 2007 financial crisis caused one 
such period of adaptation as the Fedral Reserve (FED) switched to uncon-
ventional policy actions after the funds rate reached the zero lower bound3 
(Farmer, 2012). This might cause a different response of risk taking by the 
banks. Third, the sluggish recovery of the economy signals that future eco-
nomic conditions are worse than expected (Haitsma et al., 2015). Such pessi-
mism might cause banks to hesitate to take any risks.
From the policy perspective, one of the channels through which UMPs 
affect banks’ risk taking is through the wealth effect. By increasing asset 
prices, the policy actions increase collateral values and lower delinquency 4 
and default rates, encouraging banks to take more risk in lending to bor-
rowers. In this regard, Araujo et al. (2013) shows that asset purchases by the 
FED may not necessarily increase asset prices in all circumstances. In their 
general equilibrium model, if there exists a sufficient level of collateral for 
household’s collateral constraint not to bind in equilibrium, central bank 
asset purchases will have no effect on equilibrium asset prices. 
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Based on these arguments, the study tests the hypothesis that instead of 
monetary policy, factors related to the aforementioned reasons are the main 
drivers of risk taking by the banks in the post-crisis period. These factors 
include credit crunch as measured by credit growth and expectation about 
future economic conditions. The new monetary policy regime is represented 
by using the FED’s total asset as a measure of monetary policy. After the fed 
funds reached the zero lower bound in December 2008, the FED switched to 
unconventional policy tools, namely quantitative easing. Under this new pol-
icy regime, the FED’s balance sheet is used as the main policy tool as the FED 
has directly engaged in large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAP). The 
LSAP involves the purchase of mortgage backed securities and other assets, 
leading to a massive expansion of its total asset holdings. Because of this the 
total asset holdings of the FED represent the (unconventional) monetary pol-
icy instrument for the post-crisis period. This is in line with Gambacorta et 
al. (2013) and Khatiwada (2017). Moreover, industrial production is used as a 
control for the level of economic activity. Following Delis et al. (2012), this pa-
per measures the risk taking by the banks using the total risky assets owned. 
In order to achieve its goal, this paper employs a time series regression 
where the risk taking measure is expressed as a function of credit growth, 
expected economic condition, and FED’s total asset. The empirical find-
ings show that monetary policy has been an insignificant factor during the 
post-crisis period while credit crunch and expectation about future eco-
nomic condition are found to be significant factors affecting the risk tak-
ing decision of banks. These findings imply that the risk taking channel of 
monetary policy has been ineffective after the fed funds rate reached the 
zero lower bound. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section 
presents a review of previous empirical studies in the area. Following is 
a discussion of the empirical model to be estimated. The next section de-
scribes the dataset used in the study. Then the paper presents and discuss-
es the empirical findings. Finally, the paper concludes by providing some 
policy implications. 
Literature Review
Considerable effort has been made in the empirical literature to study the 
impacts of monetary policy on the risk taking behavior of banks. Virtually 
all studies use short-term interest rate as the measure of monetary policy. 
Dellis et al. (2012) estimates the risk taking impacts of monetary policy us-
ing micro level datasets. Their study makes two significant contributions. 
First, the authors distinguish between risk taking on new and existing loans. 
Their second contribution lies in the endogeneity problem that concerns the 
potential joint identification of monetary policy and bank risk. They argue 
that bank risk could influence the stance of monetary policy and that both 
of these variables are affected by the general macroeconomic conditions. To 
solve this problem of identification, the authors use the strategy developed 
by Romer and Romer (2004). Using risky assets owned and Z-index5 for 
each bank in their sample, the authors found that lowering the interest rate 
significantly increases risk taking by the banks.
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On the other hand, Angelon et al. (2015) uses macro data and employs a 
VAR model to see the risk taking impacts of monetary policy in the U.S. Their 
major contribution is in the differentiation they make between two forms of 
risk: risk taking in the funding structure and overall risk taking. Their study 
uses data from January 1980 to September 2011. The major finding of their 
work is that a positive monetary policy shock increases the amount of fund-
ing risk taken by the banks while its effect on overall risk taking is insignifi-
cant. Similar results are also found by Abbate and Thaler (2014) using macro 
data. By identifying a Bayesian VAR through sign restrictions, the authors 
find evidence suggesting that expansionary monetary policy shock causes a 
persistent increase in proxies for bank risk taking behavior. 
Few studies have also attempted to examine the risk taking effects of 
monetary policy in Europe. Altunbas et al. (2010) tests the hypothesis that 
low level interest rate is the contributing factor to the recent banking prob-
lem in Europe and the U.S. using a comprehensive database of quarterly 
balance sheet information and risk measures. In order to disentangle the 
effects of monetary policy from other factors, the authors make control for 
bank-specific characteristics such as size, liquidity, capitalization, lending 
portfolios, and profitability. The main result of their study is that, even con-
trolling for the above factors, low levels of short-term interest rates over an 
extended period of time contributed to an increase in bank risk. 
Similar results are also found by other researchers using micro level data. 
Jimenez et al. (2014) use micro data of the Spanish Credit Register from 1984 
to 2006 to find that lower interest rates have a double-sided effect on the 
default probability of bank loans. This default probability falls in the short 
term, as the cost of interest payments decreases, but rises in the long run, as a 
result of banks lending money to riskier borrowers in exchange for a higher 
yield. This indicates increased risk taking by the banks through reaching for 
yield behavior. 
This paper contributes to the accumulating empirical literature in two 
ways. First, in evaluating the impacts of monetary policy shocks, the study 
uses the FED’s total asset as the main policy tool, instead of the commonly 
held approach of using interest rate or money supply. Secondly, in addition 
to testing the significance of monetary policy, the study attempts to point 
out the factors that have been the major drivers of risk taking during the 
post-crisis period. 
Methodology
The empirical approach to test for the risk taking effects of UMPs relies 
on a time series regression. The econometric model is given by:
At= αo+  β MPt  +  α Eyt  +δCgt  + ΥFdt  +   ut  (1)
Where A is the risky assets owned, is credit growth rate representing cred-
it crunch, and is the monetary policy measured by FED’s total asset. financial 
market distress as measured by Cleveland Financial Distress Index, and it is 
the control for uncertainty shocks that have been the major drivers of finan-
cial market dynamics over the crisis period (Gambacorta et al., 2013). denotes 
expected economic condition. It is given by the predicted values from an out-
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put equation estimated in the spirit of Tolo (2011). The results of this estima-
tion are provided in the appendix. FED’s total asset and banks’ risky assets 
enter the model in natural log while the rest of the variables enter in level. 
The main hypothesis in the estimation of Equation 1 is that the coefficients of 
credit growth and expected economic condition are jointly significant while 
that of monetary policy measure is insignificant. 
Data
The dataset used in the study is monthly data from December 2008 to 
April 2016, the last month with the complete dataset. A total of 89 observa-
tions are used for estimation purposes. It encompasses data on the following 
variables: FED’s total asset as a measure of monetary policy, industrial pro-
duction, Cleveland Financial Stress Index, and credit growth. The data are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Data on the total risky 
assets owned are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
website. All the data are seasonally adjusted. The time series plot of each 
variable is provided below and the descriptive statistics are available in the 
appendix section.
Figure 1: Time series plots; First row: Credit Growth, FED’s total asset
Second Row: Industrial Production, Risky assets owned
Third Row: Cleveland Financial Distress Index
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Estimation Results
In this section, the regression result from estimation of Equation 1 is 
discussed. From the initial regression, the results indicate the presence of 
a significant level of autocorrelation in the residuals. In order to correct for 
that, the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation is applied. This transformation 
requires the transformation of the regression model, given by Equation 1, to 
a form in which the OLS procedure is applicable. Rewriting Equation 1 for 
the period t-1, we arrive at: 
At-1= αo+  β MPt-1   +   αEyt-1  +  δCgt-1  +  ΥFdt-1   +   ut-1  (2)
Then, multiplying Equation 2 term by term by ρ and subtracting from 
Equation 1 results in:
At − At-1= β (MPt − ρMPt-1 )+ α (Eyt − ρEyt-1) + δ (Cgt− ρCgt-1 )+  Υ(Fdt − ρFdt-1 ) 
+  (ut− ρ ut-1 ) (3)
Where ρ is obtained from the AR(1) modeling of first stage regression 
resiuals ut:
ut = ρ ut-1 + εt (4)
Equation 3 can be rewritten using the residuals from Equation 4:
At - At-1 = β (MPt - ρMPt-1 ) + α (Eyt - ρEyt-1 ) + δ (Cgt - ρCgt-1  ) + ρ(Fdt - ρFdt-1 ) +  εt  (5)
By construction, the residuals in Equation 5 are white noise. 
Table 2 in the appendix presents the result of an estimation of Equation 5. 
This result indicates that monetary policy is found to have an insignificant 
effect on the amount of risk that the banks take as expected. Thus, it can 
be concluded that unconventional monetary policy actions have different 
impact on the risk taking behavior of banks than the short-term interest 
rate. On the other hand, the phenomenon of the credit crunch as measured 
by credit growth has significant impact. A one percent decrease in the cred-
it growth leads to a decrease in the amount of risk taken by the banks by 
0.4%. Moreover, the joint significance test of the coefficients of credit growth 
and expected economic conditions has a p-value of 0.0238. This implies that 
credit crunch and expectation have been significant factors affecting the 
banks’ risk taking decision. 
In order to show that these results are robust, I consider a model in which 
risk taking is expressed as a function of only the financial distress index and 
FED’s total asset. If credit crunch and expectation about future economic 
conditions cause the effect of monetary policy to disappear, then in the re-
gression without these two variables the monetary policy measure should 
have a significant coefficient. The result of this regression is presented in 
Table 3 in the appendix section, and is found to be similar to the previous 
case. The coefficient FED’s total asset remains insignificant. This indicates 
95The Impact of Monetary Policy on Banks’ Risk-taking
that in addition to the credit crunch and expectation about future economic 
conditions, there might be other factors that cause the effect of monetary 
policy to disappear.
Conclusion
This paper re-investigates the impact of monetary policy on the risk taking 
behavior of banks after the fed funds rate reached the zero lower bound. Previ-
ous studies that use short-term interest rate as the measure of monetary policy 
found that expansionary policy actions lead to an increase in the amount of 
risk taken by the banks. However, whether this finding holds in the post-crisis 
period is questionable. This is because the banks have suffered from liquidity 
problems, and recovery from the crisis has been one of the slowest in history. 
The study contributes to the ongoing literature by considering a different mea-
sure of monetary policy given by FED’s total asset. Moreover, it also proposes 
the possible factors that affect risk taking in the post-crisis period. 
The results of the study provide no evidence of any impact by monetary 
policy on the risk taking behavior of banks. Instead, credit crunch as mea-
sured by credit growth and expectation about future economic condition are 
found to be the two major factors affecting risk taking. In terms of implica-
tion for the FED, our results suggest that more attention should be given to 
the capital constraint that the banks suffer from in order to have a prudent 
macro supervision. This can be attained by altering the total reserve that the 
banks have through a change in the required reserve ratio or by tapering the 
large-scale asset purchase program and resorting to the conventional higher 
short-term interest rate policy in the event that excessive risk taking is a 
threat to the economy.
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Notes
1UMP is a term used to refer to monetary policy actions implemented after the 
short-term interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound.
2Credit crunch is a sudden reduction in the availability of credit from banks.
3The zero lower bound is when the short- term interest rate (fed funds rate) becomes zero.
4Deliquency refers to a failure to pay an outstanding debt.
5Z-index captures the probability of default of a country’s banking system.
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Variable Observation Mean Std Min Max
Asset Risk 89 9476816 608285.8 8714822 1.10e+07
Credit Growth 89 0.277313 0.5855085 -1.073507 0.533819
CFDI 89 0.3124719 1.071473 -1.92 2.89
FED’s total 
Asset
89 3236128 916481.6 1881629 4507150
Industrial 
Production
89 99.22468 5.372032 87.4125 106.6868
A1. Descriptive Statistics
Appendix A
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables in the model
Variable Coefficient P-value
Intercept 113.9 0.0288 ***
Credit growth 0.004 6.46e-05 ***
Financial Distress index 0.003 0.0688**
Expected Output 0.63 0.3363
FED’s total asset 0.012 0.9552
A2. Estimation Result of Equation 5
Table 2: Estimation result for equation. ***indicates signif-
icance at 5% and ** indicates significance at 10%
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A3.Regression Result Without Expected Output and Credit Growth
Variable Coefficient P-value
Intercept 113.9 0.0288 ***
Credit growth 0.004 6.46e-05 ***
Financial Distress index 0.003 0.0688**
FED’s total asset 0.012 0.9552
Table 3: ***indicates significance at 5%
A4.Regression Result for predicting expected economic condition
Table 4: Estmation Equation for Industrial Production
Variable Coefficient P-value
Intercept -0.5447 0.2984
Inflation 2.0800 0.0604***
Capacity Utilization 1.1967 6.18e-14***
Export of Manufactured 
Goods
0.0001 0.6855
